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REBUTTAL OF NEW POINTS
RAISED IN BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Supervisory Review is Needed Because the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit Automatically Aligned
U.S. Highway 160 with Alienated, Non-Indian Fee
Land, Ignoring this Court’s Context-Specific,
Multifactor Methodology for Determining the
Status of Reservation Roadways for Tribal
Jurisdictional Purposes.
Mirroring the position of the district court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Respondents argue that
the roadway on which the fatal tour bus/auto collision
occurred in this case--U.S. Highway 160 within the
Navajo Reservation--should be treated as non-Indian
fee land for jurisdictional purposes, as was the segment
of state highway within the Fort Berthold Reservation
in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Yet
proper application of Strate dictates that the roadway
should retain its status as tribal trust land and not be
aligned with non-Indian fee land, underscoring the Ninth
Circuit’s impermissible sanctioning of the district court’s
departure from the usual and accepted course of judicial
proceedings for addressing the jurisdictional status of
an on-reservation roadway. Granting certiorari in this
case is crucial for bringing both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit in line with this Court’s precedents
governing judicial treatment of reservation roadways for
tribal jurisdictional purposes.
In their opposing brief, Respondents misrepresent
the facts of Strate in their effort to make that case
appear factually indistinguishable from the instant one.

Respondents thus falsely portray Strate as "rejecting
tribal member’s argument" about tribal jurisdiction and
as involving "the Indian plaintiff in the vehicle accident."
Rsp. Opp. Br. 2 n.2, 12 (emphases added). But as this Court
made clear, Gisela Fredericks, the tribal~court plaintiff in
Strate, was a nonmember and a non-Indian. See Strate,
520 U.S. at 443 ("Neither Stockert nor Fredericks is a
member of the Three Affiliated Tribes or an Indian.").
Indeed, Respondents go so far as to make a misleading
change to this Court’s own language to conceal the
important factual differences between Strate and the
present case for tribal jurisdictional purposes. Compare
id. at 457 (emphasis added) (concluding that on the specific
facts of Strate, which involved only nonmember parties,
"the Fredericks-Stockert highway accident presents no
’consensual relationship’ of the qualifying kind"), with
Rsp. Opp. Br. 13 (emphasis added) (misquoting Strate as
stating generally that" ’a highway accident presents no
"consensual relationship" of the qualifying kind’ ,).1
These distortions serve only to underscore why
this Court’s supervisory review is needed: both lower
courts took a categorical approach to the issue of the
jurisdictional status of U.S. Highway 160 in this litigation,
by automatically aligning the right-of-way with nonIndian fee land and refusing to engage the careful,
context-specific, multifactor inquiry Strate demands. For
example, Respondents and both lower courts disregard
language from this Court indicating that preexisting
treaty guarantees and/or "a different congressional
1. Respondents’ misrepresentations persist even though they
were refuted in briefing to the Ninth Circuit. See Reply Brief of
Appellants at 16-17, No. 12-16958 (citing Strafe, 520 U.S. at 444 n.3).
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direction" may compel judicial deference to federal policy
upholding tribal jurisdiction in any particular case, Strate,
520 U.S. at 446, 449-50, 456, contextual factors that are
present and controlling in this case. See infra Part II.
But more generally, Strate simply does not sanction
categorical treatment of every reservation roadway as
non-Indian fee land merely because the roadway is open
to the public or maintained by a state. In this regard,
Respondents misrepresent past federal decisions in
asserting that the lower courts’ decisions in the present
case "are consistent with not only Strate... but with every
other federal case that has considered whether tribal
courts have jurisdiction over suits against non-members
involving vehicle accidents on state or federal rights-ofway." Rsp. Opp. Br. 7. Indeed, each of those past federal
appellate cases employed Strate’s multifactor analysis
rather than the categorical approach to the status of the
roadway taken by the district court and the Ninth Circuit
in the instant case. See Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848,851,
853-55 (8th Cir. 2008); Burlington Northern R. Co. v.
Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1062-64 (9th Cir. 1999); Wilson
v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 813-15 (9th Cir. 1997).2
Moreover, Respondents are simply wrong in claiming
that with respect to every past federal case addressing
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on state
or federal rights-of-way "[n]ot one has held that tribal
jurisdiction exists in these circumstances." Rsp. Opp.
Br. 7. In McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002),
2. Unlike the present case, none of these previous federal
appellate decisions involved the kind of "different congressional
direction" this Court has indicated may compel validation of tribal
authority to adjudicate a lawsuit stemming from a reservation
highway accident involving nonmembers. Strate, 520 U.S. at 446.

the Ninth Circuit faithfully applied Strate’s multifactor
methodology and concluded tribal jurisdiction existed
on a federal right-of-way, a roadway open to the public,
reasoning that the "scope of rights and responsibilities
retained by a tribe over a BIA road exceed those retained
over the state highway in Strate, and that these additional
retained rights suffice to maintain tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct on BIA roads." Id. at 538-39.
Respondents argue that the instant case is factually
identical to Strate because the Navajo Nation’s "consent
contained only one reservation," i.e., " ’the right of the
Tribe to compensation for the use of lands within said
rights of way if after such transfer said routes or any
part of them are made controlled access highways.’"
Rsp. Opp. Br. 1. Respondents fail to disclose numerous
key differences between the instant case and Strate that
are relevant and crucial to the analysis Strate requires.3
3. Attempting to reinforce the fiction that the right-of-way in
this case is identical to the one in Strate, Respondents further distort
the Ninth Circuit panel’s representation of statements made by
Petitioners during oral argument, asserting that Petitioners’ counsel
"conceded... that the Navajos have no right or authority to exclude
any travelers from U.S. Highway 160." Rsp. Opp. Br. 2. Respondents’
assertion is false. Petitioners clarified both at oral argument and
in briefing to the Ninth Circuit that they "conceded" only that the
Navajo Nation consented to the grant of a limited right-of-way for a
roadway that is open to the public (a use consistent with the original
grant of the right-of-way), but Petitioners emphasized that the Nation
retains authority to detain and exclude tour operators conducting
commercial activities in violation of the Nation’s laws. Brief of
Appellants at 31-32, No. 12-16958. Cf. Merrion v. Jicaritta Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) ("When a tribe grants a non-Indian
the right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees not to exercise its
ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as long as the non-Indian
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To begin with, Respondents are wrong when they claim
the Nation’s consent to the granting of the right-of-way
"contained only one reservation." Besides the provision
cited by Respondents the relevant intergovernmental
agreements in fact contain express reservations
(1) opposing right-of-way fencing by the state, (2) stating
the tribal chairman’s approval was "[s]ubject to any
prior valid existing right or adverse claim" and was
restricted "to the Tribal consents he is... empowered
to give" pursuant to a Navajo Tribal Council Resolution
incorporated by reference into the right-of-way agreement
itself, and (3) exempting "extraordinary actual damages"
from the Navajo Nation’s waiver of compensation. See
Joint Stipulations Regarding Documents, App. 39a-41a.
These additional restrictions, concealed by Respondents,
belie Respondents’ claim that the intergovernmental
agreements "contained only one reservation."
Moreover, there are additional distinctions implicated
in this case that Strate indicates are crucial for assessing
the jurisdictional status of an on-reservation roadway.
See Strate 520 U.S. at 449 (reiterating "the need to
inspect relevant statutes, treaties, and other materials"
when determining the extent of tribal jurisdiction over
the conduct of nonmembers). These distinctions include
(1) Congress’s preservation of the Navajo Nation’s treatybased jurisdiction with respect to the very roadway at
issue in this case, (2) other distinctly tribal interests served
by the roadway’s construction and by which Congress
preserved the contours of tribal sovereignty with respect
to the roadway, (3) the lack of any compensation--conceded
by Respondents--paid to the Navajo Nation for the limited
complies with the initial conditions of entry.").

right-of-way, and (4) the state’s agreement to be bound by
preexisting federal obligations when accepting assignment
of the right-of-way. Disregard of these crucial factors
further demonstrates the lower courts’ failure to follow
this Court’s governing precedents when analyzing the
status-of-the-roadway issue in this case.
II. Supervisory Review is Also Necessary Because
Both Lower Courts Refused to Apply Supreme
Court Precedents Governing Whether an Indian
Tribe Retains Treaty-Based Authority over the
Conduct of Nonmembers on a Tribe’s Reservation,
Effecting an Impermissible Judicial Abrogation of
the Navajo Nation’s Congressionally Confirmed,
Treaty-Based Jurisdiction in This Case.
Respondents contend that the district court and the
Ninth Circuit properly addressed Petitioners’ treaty
argument, and that the Navajo Treaty of 1868 therefore
"does not create any cert-worthy issue here." Rsp. Opp.
Br. 10. In fact, the lower courts failed to faithfully apply
this Court’s precedents for determining whether Congress
has abrogated Indian treaty rights. Although Respondents
attempt to trivialize the matter as a thing "of no moment,"
Rsp. Opp. Br. 8, the Ninth Circuit’s sanctioning the
district court’s disregard of this Court’s prescribed treaty
analysis in this case has effected an impermissiblejudiciat
abrogation of Indian treaty guarantees that subverts
the judiciary’s role in safeguarding those rights. E.g.,
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band qf Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999).
In particular, Respondents argue the lower courts
were correct in "ruling that the tribe does not.., continue
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to enjoy treaty-based ownership rights" to the roadway
at issue. Rsp. Opp. Br. 8. Yet Respondents, like the lower
courts, point to no act of Congress abrogating those
treaty rights. Nor can they. In this case Congress enacted
legislation prompting the Navajo Nation’s consent to the
grant of a limited right-of-way "in order to further the
purposes of existing treaties with the Navajo Indians."
25 U.S.C. § 631. Moreover, this Court has confirmed the
treaty-preserving purpose and effect of the legislation
in question. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona St.
Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 & n.17 (1965) (observing
with respect to the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act that
"in compliance with its treaty obligations the Federal
Government has provided for roads, education and other
services needed by the Indians").
Respondents purport to rely on Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981), for the proposition that
"[t]reaty rights with respect to reservation lands must
be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those
lands." But in South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,
687-94 (1993), this Court made clear that the abrogation
inquiry--i.e., the search for "clear evidence that Congress
actually considered the conflict between its intended action
on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty,"
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986)--must
be undertaken with respect to the particular legislation
at issue. In the unique legislative context of the present
case, wherein Congress deliberately confirmed treaty
obligations and supported tribal jurisdiction, the Navajo
Nation’s grant of a limited right-of-way was an exercise
of the Nation’s treaty rights and sovereignty, not an
abrogation or a relinquishment of them. Cf. Williams v.
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Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (noting that "cases in this
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations" and affirming that
"Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the
Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since").
III. Supervisory Review is Further Needed Because
Both Lower Courts’ Denial of the Navajo Nation’s
Retained Inherent Sovereignty over the Tour
Bus/Auto Collision Conflicts with This Court’s
Precedents for Proper Application of the Montana
Exceptions.
Respondents’ arguments reflect the erroneous
analyses of the district court and the Ninth Circuit,
wherein both lower courts failed to heed the requirements
of this Court’s precedents for assessing inherent tribal
authority over nonmember conduct based on the two
Montana exceptions. Respondents seek to trivialize
Petitioners’ objections to the lower courts’ misapplication
of the Montana-Strate framework when they repeatedly
accuse Petitioners of asking this Court merely to "assess[ ]
the facts differently" than the lower courts. Rsp. Opp. Br.
10, 11, 13. Rather, Petitioners point to the lower courts’
failure to apply legal rules and principles, set forth in
this Court’s precedents, that require judicial consideration
of several critical factors in determining the extent of
retained inherent tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of
nonmembers within an Indian reservation.
Respondents nevertheless insist that the lower courts’
application of the two Montana exceptions was adequate.
As to the first Montana exception--the "consensual
relationship" exception--Respondents assert that "the

lower courts correctly analogized this case to Strate."
Rsp. Opp. Br. 12. Respondents argue that in Strate "the
requisite nexus was missing between the consensual
relationship and the accident: the Indian plaintiff in the
vehicle accident was not a party to the tribes’ subcontract;
and the tribes were strangers to the accident." Rsp.
Opp. Br. 12. In actuality, of course, Strate did not involve
an "Indian plaintiff" at all, and Respondents’ repeated
misrepresentation of this fact underscores the fallacy in
their position that commercial touring activity, validly
subject to tribal regulation for the safety and protection of
tribal members,4 entails no "’consensual relationship’ of the
qualifying kind," Strate, 520 U.S. at 457, when a regulated
tour bus collides head-on with a passenger vehicle on a
reservation highway, killing and injuring tribal members.
Far from "fail[ing] to address the nexus gap," Rsp. Opp.
Br. 13 n.18, Petitioners argued at length to the Ninth
Circuit that in light of the Navajo Nation’s commercial
touring regulations, binding upon Respondents, the
requisite "nexus is thoroughly established in this case."
Reply Brief of Appellants at 19-20, No. 12-16958; see also
Pet. 32 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645, 656 (2001)) (noting that the circumstances of this
case "perfectly satisfy this Court’s requirement that the
particular governing authority ’imposed by the Indian
tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself’").

4. The district court ruled--and the Ninth Circuit accepted-that "[t]here is no question that the Navajo Nation has the right
to regulate tourism on the reservation" and that Respondents
"cannot claim that, by ignoring the Nation’s laws, they have not
consented to the [Navajo] Nation’s jurisdiction." App. F, 24a-25a;
see also Pet. 30.
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Embracing the lower courts’ erroneous application of
the second Montana exceptionkthis Court’s requirement
that tribal jurisdiction over nonmember conduct be
shown to be "crucial to ’the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare’" of the tribe,
Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (citation omitted)--Respondents
again misrepresent the plaintiff in Strate as an Indian,
arguing that the lower courts properly followed Strate to
deny Navajo Nation jurisdiction over the tour bus/auto
collision in the present case. Compare id. ("Opening the
Tribal Court for her [Gisela Frederick’s] optional use is
not necessary to protect tribal self-government .... "),
with Rsp. Opp. Br. 13 (emphasis added) (alteration
added by Respondents) (altering quote from Strate as
follows: " ’Opening the Tribal Court for [the Indian
plaintiff’s] optional use is not necessary to protect tribal
self-government .... ’"). In truth, the fact that (unlike
the situation in Strate) tribal members were killed and
injured in this case magnifies the error of both lower
courts in refusing to heed this Court’s admonition that
"[k]ey to... proper application" of the second Montana
exception is judicial inquiry into whether the exercise of
tribal jurisdiction in a given case implicates the tribe’s
sovereign interest in protecting tribal self-government,
controlling internal relations, or managing tribal land.
Strate, 520 U.S. at 459; see also Plains Commerce Bank
v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. Inc., 554 U.S. 316,
334, 336 (2008). Indeed, the lower courts’ disregard of all
three qualifying types of core sovereign interests--each
abundantly implicated in this litigationkconstitutes one
of the most important reasons for supervisory review to
rectify the resulting conflict with this Court’s precedents.5
5. Respondents argue that the Navajo Nation’s sovereign
interest in developing its own common law is not at risk in this
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"[A] fundamental commitment of Indian law is judicial
respect for Congress’s primary role in defining the
contours of tribal sovereignty." Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2039 (2014). In this
case, Congress deliberately chose to support the Navajo
Nation’s treaty rights and jurisdiction when it enacted
legislation prompting tribal consent to the grant of the
limited right-of-way at issue. Accordingly, supervisory
review is needed to rectify the decisions of the lower
courts in this case that conflict sharply with this Court’s
precedents for analyzing assertions of sovereign tribal
authority over the on-reservation conduct of nonmembers.
Leaving those decisions intact would effect a judicial
abrogation of the Navajo Nation’s treaty rights; a
usurpation of "Congress’s current policy judgment," id.,
protecting Navajo Nation autonomy; and a subversion of
this Court’s own Montana-Strate framework for analyzing
issues of inherent tribal sovereignty.

litigation because "Navajo common law can be and is freely
developed in the context of cases that do not involve non-member
accidents on state for federal rights-of-way." Rsp. Opp. Br. 13.
Respondents ignore this Court’s caveat in Strate that the second
Montana exception is especially important in situations like the
present one, where "the character of the tribal interest" shows that
"a State’s... exercise of authority would trench unduly on tribal
self-government," rendering state jurisdiction an "impermissible
intrusion." Strate, 520 U.S. at 458; see also Pet. 19-23 (discussing
Congress’s preemption of state jurisdiction through passage of the
1950 Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, the very statute that funded
construction of the reservation roadway at issue in this litigation).
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CONCLUSION
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
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